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Chapter    12  
Access to Justice for asylum seekers.  
Is the right to seek and enjoy asylum  
only black letter law? 
Ashley Terlouw 
12.1. Introduction 
The subject access to justice for asylum seekers is very topical. Many asylum 
seekers try to reach Europe in order to be recognised as refugees and to find 
protection from injustice in their countries of origin. However, at the moment the 
focus is on the interest of European States. After more than one million asylum 
seekers crossed the Aegean Sea in 2015, EU Member States responded by closing 
their borders thus displaying a lack of solidarity with the frontline States and 
finally on 19 March 2016 by concluding the so called EU-Turkey deal in order to 
prevent asylum seekers leaving Turkey for Greece and obliging Turkey to take 
asylum seekers back. In effect, after building the Common European Asylum 
System, which confirms obligations under the Refugee Convention, and consists 
of, among other legal requirements, the Procedures Directive guaranteeing fair 
and efficient procedures to asylum seekers, the legal pathways to Europe have 
become more and more restricted. 
 
The important issues at stake are reception capacity, solidarity between EU 
States, between the EU and other European States and solidarity with asylum 
seekers,1 the right to seek asylum and the concept of safe third country or first 
country of asylum.2 But for the EU it seems to come down to the following three 
questions: 
                                                             
1  Compare Madeline Garlick, Solidarity Under Strain. Solidarity and Fair Sharing of Respon-
sibility in Law and Practice for the International Protection of Refugees in the European Union, 
(diss. Nijmegen), Mc Plan, Mont-St-Guibert, Belgium 2016. 
2  Proposal for a common EU list of safe countries of origin, 9 September 2015, COM(2015) 452 
final and Amendment of the recast of the Procedures Directive (Directive 2013/32/EU). 
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(1) How do we deal with the burden of receiving more than one million 
asylum seekers?  
(2) How can we prevent asylum seekers crossing the external borders? 
(3) How can we oblige third countries to take back asylum seekers who have 
passed through their countries on their way to the EU?  
In this atmosphere the asylum seekers’ perspective is often missing. For asylum 
seekers access to justice is the central issue. Access to justice is a broad term with 
different layers. Firstly, the term is used to express the right of access to a court of 
law, which includes all elements of a fair trial, such as access to an independent 
judge and an effective remedy and it assumes that this access is financially 
affordable. Affordable legal aid is also part of access to justice within the meaning 
of access to a court of law. Secondly, access to justice may encompass access to 
the law, the formal law as it is laid down in legislation and jurisprudence. This not 
only presupposes knowledge of the law and of the rights it grants and of the 
possibilities to claim these rights, but also that the law functions, that it is 
effective, that the formal law is not just black letter law. Thirdly, access to justice 
may be used to express that everybody should have the right to a fair solution, to 
justice in a very broad sense. Justice in the sense of a fair solution may be 
required by law but it may be understood as rights that are not or not yet 
recognised by law: such as ‘the right to shelter and health care’ for illegally 
residing migrants. The ideas about justice may not be in conformity with formal 
law. Asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected and who have lost their 
appeal before an independent judge may still feel that they have not found access 
to justice. 
12.2. Sociology of law 
In the sociology of law it is known that there are many obstacles to attaining 
justice in the first sense (access to the courts). As a result, only a very small 
portion of all legal problems is solved through the legal system and an even 
smaller portion leads to a court case. According to Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, this is 
due to the transformation of law that must be made before a problem can be 
solved by the legal system.3 This transformation leads to problems of naming, 
blaming and claiming. In short: people have to recognise that their problem is a 
legal problem (naming), they have to know whom they can hold responsible 
(blaming) and after that they have to find out how to use the legal system 
(claiming). 
 
                                                             
3  W.F.L. Felstiner, R.L. Abel & A. Sarat, ‘The emergence and transformation of disputes: naming, 
blaming, claiming’, Law & Society Review 1981, p. 613-654. 
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This is all different when we look at asylum seekers. They don’t have difficulty 
naming and blaming. Naming happens in the country of origin at the moment 
the asylum seekers realise that they have to flee from persecution and that their 
government is to blame. Their main problem is claiming; they all have to find a 
country of refuge where they can claim to be recognised as refugees and obtain a 
residence permit. The obstacles to attaining access to justice with which asylum 
seekers are confronted are, therefore, of a different order. Even if there were full 
transposition of EU law into national laws – which is not the case: we do not yet 
have a harmonised system of norms – even if there were fair implementation of 
norms in practice – which is not the case: the law in the statute books, the 
Procedures and Reception Directives, and the Dublin Regulation, are often not 
applied in practice – even if transposition and implementation and harmoni-
sation were realised, we could hardly speak about access to justice as long as 
there is no access to the territory.  
 
It might be useful to develop a specific access to justice theory for asylum seekers 
and to recognise that instead of naming, blaming and claiming, asylum seekers 
are confronted with the following three other obstacles to attaining justice: the 
obstacles of access to the territory, access to the asylum procedure and access to a 
fair and durable solution. I will elaborate on each of these obstacles below. 
12.3. Access to the territory 
The first and most important obstacle is getting access to the territory: If we 
imagine a legal iceberg in the field of asylum, the tip of the iceberg would not 
represent the few cases that reach the courts, but would represent the difficulties 
with which asylum seekers are confronted when they try to reach Europe safely.  
For years Member States have more and more openly tried to close the doors of 
the Fortress of Europe. For a long time there have been prolonged gate checks, 
visa requirements,4 carrier sanctions,5 readmission agreements, etc.. It is difficult 
if not impossible for asylum seekers to legally enter the EU without a valid visa. 
And the new policies and proposals go even further. Member States on their own 
initiative have closed their borders. Barbed wire has appeared around Member 
State after Member State. Instead of criticising Hungary for closing its border, the 
example has been followed. Safe zones have been built and quotas established 
                                                             
4  Regulation 539/2001. 
5  Art. 26 of the Schengen Implementation Agreement and Art. 4 of Directive 2001/51. See also: S. 
Scholten, Privatisation of Immigration Control? A socio-legal Study on the Role of Private 
Transport Companies in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, (diss. Nijmegen), Ipskamp 
Drukkers 2014. 
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(Austria 37,500 a year).6 The idea of open borders within the EU seems to have 
been abolished. The EU is divided: only 17 of the 27 countries have taken any 
responsibility for asylum seekers, 10 Member States have refused to cooperate. 
The solution found has not been to put pressure on these countries - although the 
European Commission has proposed the imposition of a fine of 250,000 euro on 
the unwilling countries for each person they refuse7 - or to help them by relieving 
them of some of the burdens, but to conclude the EU-Turkey deal. 
 
And at sea, Frontex has been in action, officially to save asylum seekers from 
drowning but also to push back the loaded boats and return them to where they 
came from, without access to justice for the asylum seekers being guaranteed. 8 
Since 25 February 2016 NATO has also been helping with surveillance in the 
Aegean Sea, outside the territorial zone of the EU. In fact NATO is helping to 
guard the Turkish borders in this way and to prevent asylum seekers from 
entering Europe without any guarantee of non-refoulement. 
12.4. So how to reach Europe? 
By land, in a closed truck through Hungary9 or on a bicycle via the Russian-
Norwegian border?10 By air, deep frozen and hidden in the landing gear?11 By sea, 
                                                             
6  ‘Migrant crisis: Austria to slash asylum claims’, BBC News, 20 January 2016.  
7  The proposal formulates it as a choice: ‘The Member State which temporarily does not take 
part in the corrective allocation must make a solidarity contribution of EUR 250,000 per 
applicant to the Member States that were determined as responsible for examining those 
applications.’ Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person , 4 May 2016, COM (2016) 270;  
<eur-ex.europa.eu/procedure/NL/2016_133?qid=1462976943745&rid=1>. 
8  Ruben te Molder & Laurie Kampkuiper, ‘Frontex: is de grens bereikt?’, A&MR 2016, nr. 1 p. 
10-15; M.H.A. Strik, ‘Frontex de grenzen van zijn mandaat’, Justitiële verkenningen 2015, nr. 3, p. 
47-56. 
9  On 28 August, 71 dead asylum seekers were found in a truck at the Hungarian-Austrian border. 
10  According to Norwegian law, it is prohibited to cross the Russian-Norwegian border on foot or 
to take a hitch hiker across this border without the necessary documents. However, the 
Norwegian laws do not mention bicycles. So apparently many asylum seekers buy bicycles to 
cross the border at Storskog, close to Kirkenes, the only border crossing between Russia and 
Norway. 
11  The official possibilities to flee by air diminish. In the Netherlands for example currently 
hardly any asylum seeker enters via Schiphol airport. According to the Dutch Refugee Council 
AC Schiphol registered (Art. 6 Aliens Act) 619 asylum seekers in 2015. 
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together with 40 other asylum seekers, dressed in fake life jackets in a rubber 
vessel crossing the Mediterranean?12  
 
Where are the necessary legal pathways? For years the UNHCR pointed out that 
legal pathways to Europe would be necessary to prevent destabilisation of the 
regions.13 It stressed the necessity for resettlement, humanitarian visas, improve-
ment of the possibilities for family reunification and scholarships and sponsor-
ships. Nothing of this has happened and, indeed, the regions have been 
destabilised with, as a result, more than a million asylum seekers entering in 2015. 
The reaction of the EU Member States has been painfully lacking in any 
solidarity. There has been no solidarity with the overburdened regions, no 
solidarity between the Member States, let alone with the asylum seekers seeking 
access to justice. The plans by the European Commission to enhance legal 
avenues into Europe have so far remained nothing but good intentions.14 
 
EU Member States are reluctant to take responsibility for people intercepted or 
rescued in international waters. However, since the ECHR condemned the push 
backs and collective expulsions by Italy to Libya in the important Hirsi 
judgment15 more asylum seekers than before have been saved in the Medi-
terranean and brought to Italy. Still, it remains nearly impossible for asylum 
seekers who have been pushed back to get access to the EU. In practice it is of 
course very difficult for refused asylum seekers to have a Member State convicted 
for not fulfilling its responsibilities. Member States at the borders of the 
Mediterranean are still shamelessly pushing them back. For example Spain has 
concluded agreements with Mauritania and Senegal to have coastguards 
preventing asylum seekers fleeing to the Canary Islands; and there are the so-
called hot returns by Spain to Morocco and Hungary to Serbia.16 This might also 
                                                             
12  ‘Over 5,400 people are estimated to have lost their lives on migratory routes around the world 
in 2015, and the first half of 2016 has only seen the numbers increase. The Mediterranean 
alone witnessed a record number of at least 3,770 deaths in 2015, with numbers climbing in 
2016. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that over the last two 
decades, more than 60,000 migrants have died trying to reach their destinations, and this only 
includes deaths for which there is some record. Often occurring far from the public eye, an 
unknown number of deaths go unrecorded.’ IOM, Fatal Journeys Volume 2: Identification and 
tracing of dead and missing migrants, 2016. 
13  Recent UNHCR EXCOM 2 March 2016, 65th meeting p. 4. 
14  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels 
6 April COM (2016) 197 final: Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System and 
Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe. See also: COM(2015) 240 final and COM(2016) 270 final. 
15  EHRM 23 February 2012, appl. no. 27765/09, Hirsi Jamaa e.a. v. Italy. 
16  Margarita Martínez Escamilla et. al., ‘Hot Returns: When the State Acts outside the law.’ Legal 
report, <eprints.ucm.es/27221> 27 June 2014. 
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be an indirect consequence of, or a response to, the lack of solidarity from other 
Member States and their resistance to reforming the Dublin system.  
 
The most recent and far reaching obstacle is the much contested EU-Turkey deal. 
In exchange for money, skipping visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, and 
reopening the negotiations for the accession of Turkey to the EU, Turkey has 
promised to take back all asylum seekers (Syrians and others) and to prevent 
them fleeing to the EU. The deal also foresees possibilities for resettlement. For 
each Syrian refugee returned to Turkey, from the Greek islands, the EU will 
resettle another Syrian refugee from Turkey (the so-called ‘one for one’ 
approach), to a maximum of 72,000 Syrian refugees (including the 18,000 already 
promised). Priority will be given to those who have not tried to enter the EU 
illegally. So far, the expectations are not high. The EU will start larger 
humanitarian resettlement programmes (the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission 
Scheme) only after there has been a structural decrease in the number of arrivals 
and only if the number reaches 72,000, but there has been no agreement so far on 
when there will be a structural decrease. Furthermore there has been disagree-
ment over which refugees should be resettled. The UNHCR has urged that it 
should be vulnerable people, while the EU would prefer to accept the highly 
educated.17 
 
And what are the criteria for resettlement? We know that higher educated people 
are not brought in under the resettlement programme for Europe.18 There is 
hardly any control on the way the authorities deal with requests for resettlement 
by Syrian refugees. With regard to these questions and these small numbers one 
cannot say that there are realistic legal pathways.  
 
There are serious questions about the legality of the EU-Turkey deal. According to 
the deal some Syrians will be resettled (however not those who have been sent 
back from Greece to Turkey19) but what will happen to other returned asylum 
seekers, refused by Greece? This aspect of the deal seems to be discrimination 
based on nationality. But the main problem is that Turkey is regarded as a safe 
third country and as a first country of origin. Both of these assumptions can be 
                                                             
17  Compare Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 14028, 19 April 2016, The situation of refugees and 
migrants under the EU-Turkey, Agreement of 18 March 2016, rapporteur Tineke Strik,  
18  Wilmer Heck, ‘Erdogan: ‘EU komt deal niet na’, klopt dat?’, NRC Handelsblad 28 juli 2016. 
19  The latter do receive residence permits upon return if they were not yet in possession of such 
a permit. 
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and are contested.20 Turkey didn’t sign the 1967 New York Protocol to the Refugee 
Convention, which means that it retained the geographical limitation that 
exempts it from extending the Convention to cover non-European refugees. 
According to Amnesty International, Turkey refoules asylum seekers at the Syrian 
border.21 Human Rights Watch even reported that Turkey’s border guards shot 
asylum seekers at the borders.22 
 
And what about the current situation in Turkey after the failed coup, in which the 
principle of a free press was abolished and judges and university professors were 
dismissed?23 After the failed 15 July coup, Turkey’s Government declared a state of 
emergency and subsequently on 21 July notified the Council of Europe that it 
might derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights.24 President 
Erdogan even suggested that the death penalty should be introduced for the coup 
leaders. Since the EU-Turkey deal and now that the western Balkan route has 
been closed, refugees are increasingly trying to reach the EU via more dangerous 
routes, for example via Libya to Italy and via Bulgaria’s eastern border, where 
they meet more and more fences.25 
 
We can without any hesitation conclude that there are major obstacles to 
accessing justice in the sense of access to the territory for asylum seekers. 
Member States do not even hide that they do everything to prevent asylum 
seekers gaining access to EU territory. We must protect our external borders is 
                                                             
20  See for example: UNHCR High Commissioner for Refugees, Legal considerations on the return 
of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation 
in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe third country and first country of asylum 
concept, 23 March 2016; Sergio Carrera & Elspeth Guild, EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees 
is fraught with legal and procedural challenges, 10 March 2016, CEPS Thinking ahead for 
Europe; Den Heijer et. al., ‘Coercion, Prohibition, and great expectations’, CMLR June 2016 
(translated in Dutch: NJB 2016 nr. 24, p. 1672 ff.). See also: DRC/ECRE, Desk research on appli-
cation of a safe third country and first country of asylum concepts to Turkey, May 2016. 
21  Amnesty International 31 March 2016: <www.amnesty.nl/nieuwsportaal/nieuws/turkije-
stuurt-op-grote-schaal-vluchtelingen-terug-naar-syrie>. 
22  Human Rights Watch: Turkey: Border Guards Kill and Injure Asylum Seekers, 10 May 2016. 
23  According to Amnesty International there is ‘credible evidence that detainees in Turkey are 
being subjected to beatings and torture, including rape, in official and unofficial detention 
centres in the country. The organization is calling for independent monitors to be given 
immediate access to detainees in all facilities in the wake of the coup attempt, which include 
police headquarters, sports centres and courthouses. More than 10,000 people have been 
detained since the failed coup.’ Amnesty international 24 July 2016. 
24  It is according to Art. 15 ECHR possible to derogate from the obligations of this Convention in 
emergency situations. 
25  Read for example: Slovenians faith in a fence, Deutsche Welle, 4 August 2016-10-21: 
<www.dw.com/en/ slovenians-faith-in-a-fence/a-19450017>. 
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the ever repeated message. Many asylum seekers do not survive the dangerous 
journey to Europe. Nevertheless they keep coming. In the first seven months of 
2016, 250,000 asylum seekers managed to reach the EU, since the EU-Turkey deal, 
mainly to Italy. This number is remarkably lower than the one million asylum 
seekers in 2015. One could say that at the moment the argument of the high 
numbers can no longer be an argument for the EU for not organising the legal 
pathways for which the UNHCR has urged. Besides, legal pathways will probably 
contribute to further lowering the number of spontaneous arrivals. 
12.5. Access to the asylum procedure 
The second burden is obtaining access to the asylum procedure: Lack of access to 
the territory also means lack of access to an asylum procedure. But even if asylum 
seekers reach the EU access to an asylum procedure is problematic. Of course we 
have the important recast of the Procedures Directive26 and Art. 47 of the Charter 
which require fair procedures for every asylum seeker. The purpose of the recast 
of the Procedures Directive is to establish common standards for Member States’ 
procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status. It guarantees, for 
example, access to procedures, the right to appeal an asylum decision, the right to 
remain in the country during appeal procedures and the right to legal aid.27 
However, this Directive also contains many derogation clauses and many 
optional clauses and a part of it is still black letter law. Not every Member State 
has implemented the Directive but even if it has the law in the statute books is 
not always law in action. For example in Germany the recast of the Procedures 
Directive has not yet been implemented. The European Commission has started 
an infringement procedure. Besides, there are signs that in other countries the 
Procedures Directive has been implemented in the most minimal way. There is, 
at the very least, reluctance to implement the Directive in a full and positive 
way.28  
                                                             
26  Recast procedures Directive (Directive 2013/32/EU). 
27  American research shows that nationwide only 37 percent of all immigrants in the U.S. had 
legal representation, and only 14 percent of immigrants had a lawyer (Michelle Waslin, ‘Access 
to Legal Representaion is Unequal and the Consequences are serious’ in Immigration Courts, 
Right to Council Immigrants’, Paper submitted 28 September 2016: 
<immigrationimpact.com/2016/09/28/immigrants-access-legal-representation-unequal-
consequences-serious>). I am not aware of European research with regard to legal represen-
tation of asylum seekers, but regarding the consequences of not having access to legal repre-
sentation, such research would be useful. 
28  The European Commission evaluation report on the application of the Directive on minimum 
standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status: 
<ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/com_2010_465_en.pdf>.  
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The Dublin system is aimed at sharing responsibilities, preventing refugees in 
orbit and preventing forum shopping, but in practice seems to have turned out to 
be contra productive as Member States are reluctant to take responsibility for 
refugees.29 The Dublin responsibility rules are based on the idea of a harmonised 
asylum system but the situation for asylum seekers in the EU is far from 
harmonised and the responsibility division rules, which are primarily based on 
the idea that the country of first entry or where the asylum claim is first lodged, 
leads to frustration on the part of both asylum seekers and the countries at the 
external borders.30 For the asylum seekers this leads to non-registration in the 
first country of arrival and throwing away any documents that can prove that 
they entered the EU. The Member States of first asylum entry close their eyes to 
this and are tempted to keep their asylum system below the EU norms in order to 
prevent returns from other Member States (or prevent Dublin claims). Other 
Member States close their borders31 in order to prevent secondary movements or 
to be held responsible if they cannot return the refugees.32 In short, the Dublin 
system has failed.33 
 
But the main problem of access to an asylum procedure at the moment exists for 
the around 50,000 asylum seekers who are in Greece. So far ‘the total number of 
                                                                                                                                                             
From the conclusion (be aware: concerns first Procedures Directive): ‘This evaluation 
confirms that some of the Directive's optional provisions and derogation clauses have 
contributed to the proliferation of divergent arrangements across the EU, and that procedural 
guarantees vary considerably between Member States. This is notably the case with respect to 
the provisions on accelerated procedures, 'safe country of origin', 'safe third country', personal 
interviews, legal assistance, and access to an effective remedy. Thus, important disparities 
subsist. A number of cases of incomplete and/or incorrect transposition and flaws in the 
implementation of the Directive have also been identified. The cumulative effect of these 
deficiencies may make procedures susceptible to administrative error. It is noteworthy, in this 
regard, that a significant share of first instance decisions is overturned on appeal. The present 
report shows that the objective of creating a level playing field with respect to fair and 
efficient asylum procedures has not been fully achieved.’ 
29  René Bruin, Stefan Kok & Ashley Terlouw, ‘Dublin, Interstatelijk vertrouwen is een fictie’, 
Justitiële Verkenningen, 3-15; Stefan Kok, ‘Hoe functioneert het Dublinsysteem? Over de 
weerbarstige praktijk’, A&MR 2016 nr. 6/7 p. 291 ff. 
30  Compare Den Heijer et. al., ‘Coercion, Prohibition, and great expectations’, CMLR June 2016 
(in Dutch: NJB 2016 nr. 24, p. 1672 ff.). 
31  Art. 26 Schengen Border Code. Regulation 562/2006 allows for reintroduction of internal 
border controls for periods of two years. 
32  Compare: Guild et al. ‘Enhancing CEAS and alternatives for Dublin’, Study for the LIBE 
Committee, July 2015. 
33  DG Migration and Home Affairs, Evaluation of the implementation of the Dublin III 
regulation, 18 March 2016. 
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pledges remains low at 7,463 - only 11% of the total target of 66,400 to be 
relocated from Greece to other EU Member States by September 2017’.34 After the 
closure of the borders between Macedonia and Greece in 2015 they found 
themselves between the Scylla of the Mediterranean and a possible return to 
Turkey and the Charybdis of the closed Macedonian borders and the reception 
camps without a real prospect of an asylum procedure. Due to the EU-Turkey 
deal the new arrivals in Greece diminished in April 2016. Nevertheless, according 
to the Parliamentary Assembly report refugees at risk: ‘as a result of the co-
ordinated closure of borders along the western Balkans route, there are now 
46,000 refugees and migrants blocked in mainland of Greece and a further 8,500 
on the islands. Those on the mainland who qualify for international protection 
will be forced to stay in Greece, whose reception and integration capacity 
remains seriously insufficient, until relocated to another country participating in 
the European Union’s relocation scheme – or until they find a clandestine way to 
continue their journey north, most probably in the hands of migrant smugglers. 
Those on the islands are for the most part detained in inadequate conditions, and 
in all cases subject to the vagaries of the dysfunctional Greek asylum system for 
assessment of whether or not they will be returned to Turkey. In 2016, 89% of 
arrivals were from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq but the asylum seekers who arrived 
after the closing of the Macedonian border in February, were stuck over in 
Greece.’35  
 
Refugees on the mainland do not fall within the EU-Turkey deal, but Greece has 
to offer them a fair asylum procedure in accordance with the Procedures Direc-
tive. These procedures have hardly started, as the Greek Government first had to 
organise the reception of tens of thousands of refugees. Nevertheless, this is of 
course not a good reason for not organising access to the procedure. Besides, the 
other Member States should, to reduce the burden on Greece, comply with their 
promise to relocate 66,000 refugees.  
 
Since 2011, both European Courts have regarded the procedures and the 
reception of asylum seekers in Greece as insufficiently fair.36 At the time of 
writing, August 2016, the situation seems to be even worse. Until 20 March 2016 
the asylum seekers and other migrants could freely enter and leave the hotspots 
                                                             
34 See: <data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/documents.php?page=1&view=grid> consulted 14 August 
2016. 
35  As of June 10th there were 57,000 asylum seekers stranded in Greece. See COM(2016)817. More 
than 8,500 of them remained on the Islands with hotspots. 
36  ECHR 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, MSS v. Belgium and Greece; CJEU 21 December 2011, 
C-411/10 NS and C-493/10 M.E.  
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on the islands of Lesbos and Chios; since then this has no longer been possible 
and the hotspots have been turned into detention centres. Procedures have 
gradually been established, but according to the Parliamentary Assembly the 
Greek asylum system lacks, among other things the capacity to ensure timely 
registration of asylum applications, issue first instance decisions or deter-
mination of appeals. Furthermore, remedies against decisions to return asylum 
seekers to Turkey do not always have automatic suspensive effect. 37 Moreover, 
the Assembly warns that the detention of asylum seekers in the hotspots on the 
Aegean Islands may be incompatible with the requirements of Art. 5 of the ECHR, 
due notably to procedural failures undermining the legal grounds for detention 
and adequate detention conditions. On 19 April 2016, three Afghan refugees 
lodged a complaint with the ECtHR against Greece: they considered their 
detention in the hotspot on Chios to be a violation of Art. 5 ECHR, because of the 
duration and the circumstances of their detention and the lack of information on 
the reason for the detention.38 On 26 May, the Court asked the parties if the 
detention circumstances in the hotspot in Chios had led to a violation of Arts. 3 
or 5 and if the length of the detention had been reasonable, taking into account 
the (lack of) progress in the processing of the asylum claims, and if the detainees 
had been informed in an understandable language about the reasons for their 
detention, in conformity with Art. 5(2) ECHR.  
 
According to the European Commission, by 12 June 2016 the Appeals Committees 
had decided in 70 cases of Syrian refugees that Turkey was not a safe country.39 
On 16 June, the Greek parliament adopted an amendment to the new Greek Law 
(Law 4375, entered into force in April 2016) with a view to introducing a new 
Appeals Body. This happened after the Greek Government disagreed with the 
outcome of these appeals, and decided to review the composition of the Appeals 
Committees). The Appeals Committees had decided in almost all appeals that the 
claims could not be declared inadmissible; they were not convinced that Turkey 
would be a safe third country within the sense of Article 38 APD. Two appeals 
have been rejected so far: in these cases the applicants have filed a complaint 
with the ECHR. In one of the two cases, the Court has already decided not to take 
an interim measure.40 
                                                             
37 See the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of 19 April 2016. Doc. 14028 Report; Tineke 
Strik, ‘Gestrand in Griekenland’, A&MR 2016, nr. 6/7 p. 311 ff. 
38 ECHR introduite 19 avril 2016, 22696/16, Javid Raoufi v. Greece, <hudoc.echr.coe.int>. 
39  Second Report on the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey; Brussels, 
15.6.2016 COM(2016) 349. And: ECRE 17 June 2016: The Lesvos hotspot: refugees stuck on the 
island, http://www.ecre.org/the-lesvos-hotspot/ 
40  ECHR 31181/16, Maliki vs Greece. 
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Moreover, on 22 March and 19 May, three similar applications for annulment of 
the EU-Turkey deal were lodged with the General of the EU Court of Justice 
under Article 263 TFEU. Two cases were brought on behalf of nationals from 
Pakistan residing in Lesbos, the third one was launched by an Afghan national 
staying in Athens. The applicants stated that the EU-Turkey deal exposed them to 
the risks of refoulement to Turkey or indirect refoulement to Pakistan or 
Afghanistan. Besides they complained that they were, in this way, obliged to 
apply for international protection in Greece, against their will. The applicants 
have requested that the case proceed under an expedited procedure.41 
 
So far the Greek asylum procedure can still not be regarded as a real and 
functioning fair procedure. Nevertheless a start has been made. Although incom-
parable to the Greek disaster, all over Europe asylum seekers are confronted with 
long waiting periods sometimes in dreadful conditions. This is also the case in the 
Netherlands. In the company of some Macedonian lawyers I visited the reception 
centre in the former prison in de Havenstraat Amsterdam. I was shocked by the 
detention-like situation in which some 350 men had been living for five months. 
But the Macedonians were impressed and compared it to the situation of 
refugees at their borders, waiting in containers in the snow. 
 
We can conclude that although the differences in this respect within the EU are 
enormous, access to justice for asylum seekers in the sense of access to an asylum 
procedure is problematic; even if they overcome the obstacle of access to the 
territory and manage to reach Europe, access to an asylum procedure is far from 
guaranteed. 
12.6. Access to a fair and durable solution 
The third obstacle is getting access to a fair and durable solution. It sometimes 
seems to be forgotten that asylum seekers do not only have the immediate right 
to non-refoulement as long as their claims have not been processed in a fair and 
efficient procedure, but that if they are refugees, they also have other kinds of 
rights, the right to safety and perspective in the long term. They have the right to 
access to justice in the widest sense: access to a fair and durable solution (the 
right to enjoy asylum). The Refugee Convention is not only about protection but 
also about full participation in the host country. In fact the Refugee Convention is 
mainly about these other kinds of rights. It requires for example in Arts. 23 and 24 
                                                             
41  CJEU (pending), T-192/16 NF v. European Council; CJEU (pending), T-193/16 NG v. European 
Council; CJEU (pending), T-257/16, NM v. European Council.  
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS  255 
equal treatment with citizens with regard to elementary education, social 
security and health care and in Art. 21] with regard to housing treatment as 
favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to 
aliens generally in the same circumstances. 
 
According to the UNHCR, 65.3 million individuals have been forcibly displaced 
worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human 
rights violations. It estimates that 41% of those under the UNHCR’s mandate were 
in a protracted situation by the end of 2015.42 As far as the Syrian refugees in 
Turkey are concerned, Mr. Hanno van Gemund, Protection Officer at the UNHCR 
with responsibility for developing and implementing programmes for refugees in 
Turkey, writes that Turkey houses 2.7 million Syrian refugees of whom 260,000 
are in refugee camps. The living conditions of the latter are good: there is 
education for the children, shops, medical care. However the situation for the 
90% of the other refugees, living outside the camps, is much more difficult. 
According to the World Food Programme, 90% of them live below the poverty 
line. Only 40% of the Syrian children attend school.43 
 
 Within the EU, durable solutions and material rights are not always offered. 
Apart from the situation in Greece, in other better equipped Member States, like 
Germany and the Netherlands, asylum seekers are also confronted with several 
problems with regard to their reception and material situation. 
 
The European Commission, which always seemed to be in favour of equal 
treatment for refugees and persons eligible for subsidiary protection, announced 
that it would investigate whether differentiation was necessary in order to 
prevent secondary movement.44 In the most recent proposal to replace the 
Qualification Directive by a Regulation, the Commission concluded (fortunately) 
that support for differentiation is lacking and some Member States even stressed 
‘the importance of not unduly undermining integration prospects via the 
perception that the protection may only be temporary’.45 So we may assume that 
                                                             
42  UNHCR Global trends. Forced displacement in 2015. 
43  Hanno van Gemund, ‘Medeverantwoordelijk voor meer dan 2,7 miljoen vluchtelingen, 
Europese column’, A&MR 2016, nr. 6/7, p. 351. 
44  COM (2016) 197 final. 
45  Proposal for a regulation on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees 
or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted 
and amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents, explanatory memorandum, p. 10 “On the 
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equal treatment for refugees and those persons with subsidiary protection will be 
required.  
 
The right for a third country national to accept work in another Member State is 
only permitted with conditions after five years’ legal stay.46 Art. 34 of the Refugee 
Convention prescribes that the Contracting States shall as far as possible 
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees and in particular that 
they shall make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce 
as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings. How does this relate 
to the integration requirements Member States more and more also impose on 
refugees47 and to the requirements of longer and longer periods of legal stay 
before a refugee may be naturalized? 
 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is silent on the issue of 
family reunification. And although Article 8(1) ECHR grants everyone ‘the right to 
respect for his private life and family life’, Article 8 ECHR does not grant a right to 
family reunification. Nevertheless according to steady jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Article 8 ECHR does protect the 
family life of refugees if the interruption of family life was solely a result of the 
decision to flee the country of origin out of a genuine fear of persecution within 
the meaning of the Refugee Convention. In such cases there are insurmountable 
obstacles to re-establishing family life in the country of origin and family 
reunification in the country of refuge should be granted.48 In 2003, the Family 
Reunification Directive was adopted. 49  More favourable rules for family 
reunification for refugees (but not for those persons with subsidiary protection) 
are laid down in Articles 9-12, exempting refugees from the waiting period and 
from complying with income, housing and integration requirements. However 
since the number of refugees has risen, Member States are giving an increasingly 
minimalistic interpretation of the requirements of Art. 8 ECHR and the Family 
Reunification Directive, some of them by making a distinction between family 
reunification for refugees and those persons with subsidiary protection. Germany 
and Sweden, for example, are suspending the right to family reunification for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
level of rights granted to beneficiaries, Member States did not generally support the idea of 
further differentiating between the two international protection statuses.’ 
46  Art. 14 Directive 2011/51/EU (Long-term residence) 
47  In the Netherlands asylum seekers have the obligation to integrate as soon as they are 
recognized as refugees and have to do an integration exam within three years. Sanctions are 
primarily financial (a fine of 1250 euro) but failing the test can also lead to refusal of 
permanent status (Art. 34(1) Dutch Aliens Act.  
48  For example ECtHR 1 March 2006, appl. no. 60665/00, Tuquabo-Tekle a.o. v. the Netherlands.  
49  Directive 2003/86 on the right to Family Reunification. 
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latter group.50 But there are also proposals to make the conditions for family 
reunification for refugees more restrictive. For example in Belgium, the special 
treatment given to family members of refugees will be reduced from twelve to 
three months after the status has been granted, and in Norway waiting periods of 
four years have been proposed and Sweden wants to allow family reunification 
only if both spouses are 21 years of age. According to Groenendijk, in several 
countries the waiting period has or will be introduced or existing periods 
extended. In Norway the government proposed to allow family reunification only 
after persons with international protection have worked and studied for four 
years in Norway. In Denmark a waiting period of three years has been introduced 
for beneficiaries of temporary or subsidiary protection. In Austria, a bill with a 
similar restriction has recently passed.51 In February 2016, Germany introduced a 
two-year waiting period for persons with subsidiary protection.52 The Swedish 
government proposed to suspend the family reunification for all protection 
categories suggesting that the suspension might be lifted for convention refugees 
after three years.'53  
 
As there was no common definition of subsidiary protection at the moment of 
adoption of the Family Reunification Directive, this group doesn’t fall within its 
scope. And as the Directive has never been reviewed, this exclusion has not yet 
been lifted. But what could be the justification for treating those with subsidiary 
protection (among them many Syrians) in this regard differently from Conven-
tion Refugees? It seems as if the Member States are simply taking advantage of 
this legal loophole.  
                                                             
50  See Mark Klaassen & Jorrit Rijpma, ‘Vluchtelingencrisis, gezinsleven en het risico van een race 
to the bottom’, A&MR 2016, nr. 6/7 p. 316 e.v. The CJEU in its recent judgment in the Alo and 
Osso case observed that from the recitals of Directive 2011/95 it is clear that “the EU legislature 
intended, in responding to the call of the Stockholm Programme, to establish a uniform status 
for all beneficiaries of international protection and that it accordingly chose to afford 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection the same rights and benefits as those enjoyed by 
refugees, with the exception of derogations which are necessary and objectively justified.” 
CJEU 1 March 2016, C-443/14, Alo and C-444/14, Osso, par. 32.  
51  996 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXV. GP: 
<www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/I/I_00996/fname_498905.pdf> [accessed 18 August 
2016]. 
52  Migrationsverket, Legislative changes that will effect asylum seekers, 16 April 2016; Die 
Bundesregierung, Asylpakket II in Kraft: Kürzere Verfahren, weniger Familiennachzung, 17 
March 2016. 
53  Commissioner for Human Rights, Concept Note in the view of the Expert Brainstorming 
meeting on Family reunification for refugees, beneficiaries of other forms of international 
protection and asylum seekers, Strasbourg, 1 April 2016, prepared by Professor Kees 
Groenendijk.  
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In the Netherlands, the total waiting period for family reunification may amount 
to two years. At the end of 2015, the Secretary of State announced that, it might 
take fifteen months before a decision on the asylum application was given. 
Moreover the Dutch Government decided to extend the time limit for deciding 
on family reunification for refugees to the maximum time limit in the Directive, 
which is nine months.54 This race to the bottom with regard to the possibilities for 
family reunification is in contradiction with the harmonisation, equal treatment 
and protection aims of the CEAS. As a result it may take an unacceptably long 
time before the families of the refugees can join them. Some asylum seekers even 
return to dangerous situations out of concern for their family members left 
behind. 
 
In the meantime, asylum seekers are more and more confronted with the anti-
migrant actions of the extreme right and xenophobic and racist reactions. As the 
UN Secretary General stated in his report of 21 April 2016: ‘I note with grave 
concern that xenophobic and racist responses to refugees and migrants seem to 
be reaching new levels of stridency, frequency and public acceptance....’55 So even 
after eventual access to the country of reception is granted to the refugees, it is far 
from guaranteed that they will be able to integrate within a friendly climate.  
To conclude, even if there is access to the EU territory and even if there is access 
to an asylum procedure, access to justice in the sense of access to a fair and 
durable solution is not guaranteed at all.  
12.7. How can access to justice be improved? 
Firstly there should be access to the territory, which means a safe and, thus, legal 
pathway to Europe. This has been stressed by the UNHCR for years.56 It has 
subsequently been underlined by many others who also stress that this is the only 
way to combat human smuggling. Eduard Nazarski, director of the Dutch Section 
of Amnesty International has asked us to remember the Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, by which in 1989, 1.6 million Vietnamese boat refugees were saved. Why 
can’t we make such a Comprehensive Plan of Action for the Syrians? It is not 
                                                             
54  Letter of the Dutch Secretary of State for Safety and Justice, Dijkhof, 27 November 2015, TK 
2015-2016, nr. 19637, nr. 2086.  
55  United Nations, General Assembly 21 April 2016, Seventieth session, In safety and dignity: 
addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, report of the Secretary-General, p. 11. 
56  For example by António Guterres, Geneva 10 December 2014: High Commissioner’s Dialogue 
on Protection Challenges, Protection at Sea. Opening remarks. See also UNHCR General 
Assembly 21 April 2016 A/70/59: In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees 
and migrants. Report of the Secretary-General. 
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impossible, but it is a lack of will and solidarity and the fear that this will attract 
more asylum seekers to the EU than would otherwise come.57 And why do we 
only focus on Syrians? We should not forget all the other asylum seekers. At least 
we should accept that people will keep coming and open the possibility for 
asylum seekers to apply for a visa to the EU and strive for resettlement of people 
who are staying in the overloaded camps in the region58 and in third countries at 
the borders of the EU. 
 
Secondly, access to a fair procedure should be guaranteed. As full 
implementation of the Procedures Directive was not achieved, it seems to be a 
good idea to replace it with a directly applicable Regulation (COM (2016) 467 
final). It can however be questioned whether the content of this Regulation will 
really contribute to improving access to justice for asylum seekers, if the 
proposed further acceleration of the procedures and the obligatory safe country 
provisions are accepted.  
 
An improvement in access to justice for asylum seekers cannot be expected from 
the proposal of the European Commission for a new recast of the Dublin 
regulation.59 The proposal is not based on solidarity; it sticks with the status quo 
and even contains an obligation to return and negative stimuli for asylum seekers 
as rights will be withheld if they decide to travel onward to another Member 
State. Furthermore it aims to conclude other agreements with transit countries 
comparable with the EU-Turkey deal without taking sufficiently into account the 
asylum seekers’ perspective.60 
 
The EU should also take the Hirsi judgment seriously and take responsibility if 
there is causality between a violation of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers 
in a third country, like Libya, or Turkey or Serbia, on the one hand, and a 
readmission agreement or other forms of push backs on the other hand. The 
proposal by the European Commission to make Union law applicable in cases of 
                                                             
57  Eduard Nazarski, ‘De Vietnamezen gingen bijna zonder wanklank op in hun nieuwe landen’, 
Wordt Vervolgd, maart 2016, nr. 3. 
58  T. Strik, Resettlement Report Council of Europe. UNHCR Projected Global resettlement Needs 
2016: www.unhcr.org/53408c4fda.htlm. 
59  Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) Brussels, 
4.5.2016 COM(2016) 270 final. 
60  20 May 2016, COM (2016)270 final. 
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extraterritorial action by Frontex is hopeful.61 Moreover, Europe should invest in 
research for alternatives in order to offer fair procedures. In my view, the 
proposals on joint processing within the EU are rather promising: the 
establishment of a migration protection agency at EU level with joint teams of 
officials (asylum expert teams) who have the power to take decisions on claims 
submitted to Member States (or to the EU as such). 62 This joint processing could 
be combined with the idea of hotspots. This, of course, requires a real, uniform 
and common procedure which includes lawyers and judges present at the 
hotspots, as well as adequate reception standards in open centres. It also requires 
that the EU takes responsibility for providing durable solutions to relocation for 
those whose requests have been positively decided, which means social inclusion 
and access to family reunification, education, work and free movement; and 
return of those whose requests have been refused, in order to avoid their staying 
in orbit around the hotspots. 
 
The idea of joint processing in Europe is so much better than ideas about 
reception and eventual processing in the region. In the regions access to justice is 
a fairy tale. The idea of joint processing is not new. The UNHCR proposed it in 
200363 and the EASO even started eight joint processing pilots in 2014.64 But there 
still seems to be a lack of political will to join forces and competences. 
 
Finally, as the UN Secretary General stressed, migration and development are 
linked. There is therefore ‘a need to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian 
and development assistance in responding to large movements of refugees and 
migrants. Humanitarian and development actors must work together towards 
                                                             
61  European Commission, Strasbourg, 15.12.2015 COM(2015) 671 final 2015/0310 (COD); Proposal 
for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the European Border and 
Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and 
Council Decision 2005/267/EC. Preambles 28 and 29. 
62  Goodwinn Gill (2015), ‘Regulating Irregular’ Migration: International Obligations and 
International Responsibilities’: Keynote Address at an international workshop, National and 
Kapodistrian University of Athens Faculty of Law, 20 March 2015, in Goodwinn-Gill (2015) The 
Mediterranean Papers. See also…Stockholm Programme 2009, 6.2.1.: the Council …invites the 
Commission to finalise its study on the feasibility and legal and practical implications to 
establish joint processing of asylum applications.’; H. Urth, M. Heegarard Bausager, H. M. 
Kuhn, J. Van Selm, ‘Study on the legal and practical implications of establishing a mechanism 
for joint processing of asylum applications on the territory of the European Union’, Rammboll 
and Eurasylum February 2013, HOME/2011?ERFX/FW/04; ACVZ 2016, Delen in 
verantwoordelijkheid (Sharing responsibilities; A proposal for a European Asylum System 
based on solidarity). 
63  See UNHCR Working Paper ‘UNHCR’S three-pronged proposal’, UNHCR Geneva June 2003. 
64  EASO Newsletter September 2015, ‘establishment of ‘hotspots’. 
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achieving collective outcomes over multi-year periods on the basis of 
comparative advantage, particularly in situations of protracted displacement’. He 
also points to the need for changing the tenor of policy and public discourse on 
migrants and refugees.  
 
‘The tenor (...) must be shifted from one of threat to one of international solidarity, 
protection of dignity and recognition of positive contributions. Such efforts need to 
take address the fears and concerns of host communities, and they must be based on 
facts rather than assumptions and misinformation. Given the overwhelming 
evidence that personal contact significantly reduces prejudice, more creative ways of 
fostering contacts between host communities on the one hand and refugees and 
migrants on the other, are urgently needed.’ 65 
12.8. Conclusion 
In conclusion, with regard to access to justice for asylum seekers in the EU, the 
problem is of course that in order to realise any alternative closer collaboration, 
more solidarity and acceptance of responsibilities for the externalisation of EU 
policies will be needed. And the EU is not in the mood for this. That is not only a 
pity, it is very unwise. In order to succeed, the Common European Asylum 
System should not remain black letter law, for law in action a true asylum 
seekers’ perspective will be needed. 
 
The conclusions above are all rather normative. With regard to my earlier remark 
that there should be a specific access to justice theory for asylum seekers I do not 
aim at a normative theory but at a theory based on the empirical findings that 
access to justice for asylum seekers is – in contrast with other fields of law – not a 
question of naming, blaming and claiming. Asylum seekers are confronted with 
other obstacles on the road to access to justice. The theory should seek to analyse 
and understand these obstacles. One of the explanations could be that asylum 
seekers are seen as a burden and that obstacles are raised on purpose in order to 
prevent asylum seekers access to justice in Europe. Another explanation could be 
that asylum seekers are more and more regarded as a group instead of as 
individuals. Finally these obstacles could be understood by realising that asylum 
seekers who have not yet reached the EU are not seen as people with rights but as 
outsiders, not falling within the responsibilities of the EU. This is only meant as a 
starting point for a sociology of law theory of access to justice for asylum seekers, 
but it is clear that the current theories on access to justice can insufficiently 
                                                             
65  United Nations, General Assembly 21 April 2016, Seventieth session, In safety and dignity: 
addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, report of the Secretary-General, p. 11. 
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explain the obstacles asylum seekers are confronted with if they seek protection 
against persecution. 
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